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Bordering on Legality: Canadian Church
Sanctuary and the Rule of Law
Sean Rehaag

Abstract

Introduction

Sanctuary is an institution which, in the Christian tradition,1 traces its roots to religious norms, ancient Greek and
Roman law, medieval European law, and Catholic canon
law.2 In many Western states this institution was explicitly
abolished as a matter of state law3 by the early seventeenth
century.4 However, sanctuary appears to be undergoing
something of a revival in recent years.5
In Canada, most contemporary sanctuary incidents
involve unsuccessful refugee claimants who allege that their
claims were wrongly denied. With the permission of faithbased communities, these unsuccessful refugee claimants
take up residence in sacred buildings, usually Christian
churches.6 Canadian immigration officials are reluctant
to enter churches for the purposes of enforcing immigration law. As a result, those taking sanctuary benefit from
a de facto suspension of deportation while they remain
within churches. In many cases, this suspension of deportation ultimately ends with migrants securing Canadian
permanent residence through discretionary immigration
procedures.7
In media accounts and popular discourse about Canadian
sanctuary incidents, arguments about the legality of these
practices play a central role. To date, however, few legal
scholars have critically assessed the competing legal claims
at stake. This article seeks to offer such an assessment, focusing on evaluating rule-of-law arguments deployed by the
proponents and critics of sanctuary.
The article begins by outlining Canadian sanctuary
practices. Next it examines the screening mechanisms
that Canadian churches deploy to decide who, among the
many that request it, is accorded sanctuary. Interestingly,
these screening mechanisms mimic the official refugee
determination system: lawyers get involved, alleged fears of
persecution are scrutinized, supporting country condition
documentation is considered, and various interpretations of

This paper examines church sanctuary incidents in Canada
involving unsuccessful refugee claimants seeking to avoid
deportation. The author contends that when faith-based
communities develop formal screening mechanisms to
determine who among the many that request it is accorded
sanctuary, they apply similar norms and procedures as
those found in Canada’s official refugee determination
process. The author argues that although sanctuary practices are often criticized as a form of civil disobedience that
poses a threat to the rule of law, it is also possible to understand sanctuary practices as a means through which faithbased communities prevent the state from violating both
Canadian and international refugee law, thereby upholding rule-of-law norms.

Résumé

Cet article examine les cas de sanctuaire survenus au
Canada dans une église impliquant des demandeurs d’asile
déboutés visant à éviter la déportation. Lorsque les communautés confessionnelles, soutient l’auteur, mettent au point
des mécanismes de contrôle formels pour déterminer à qui,
parmi les nombreux demandeurs, accorder le sanctuaire,
elles appliquent des normes et des procédures similaires à
celles qu’on trouve dans le processus officiel canadien de
détermination de réfugiés. Bien que ces pratiques de sanctuaire soient souvent critiquées comme une forme de désobéissance civile qui constitue une menace pour la primauté
du droit, l’auteur soutient qu’il est également possible de
les comprendre comme moyen par lequel les communautés confessionnelles empêchent l’État de porter atteinte au
droit tant canadien qu’international des réfugiés, confirmant ainsi les normes de la règle de droit.
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to arrest migrants in sanctuary.16 Similarly, no sanctuary providers were charged with violating Canadian law.17
More surprisingly, in 58 per cent of the sanctuary incidents
Lippert identifies, migrants in sanctuary ultimately secured
the legal right to remain in Canada indefinitely, usually as
Permanent Residents.18 In the remaining cases, migrants
either voluntarily left the church to go underground or to
co-operate with their deportation (25 per cent), or the outcome was unclear or pending at the time of the study (14 per
cent).19
Without wishing to downplay the hardship associated
with spending several months physically confined to a
church building that is not designed for human habitation,20
it must be said that the success rate that Lippert identifies
in sanctuary incidents is truly remarkable. To put this rate
in context, consider that the success rate in judicial reviews
of negative refugee determinations is less than 2 per cent.21
Other means of delaying deportation are similarly ineffectual.22 In other words, sanctuary is one of the most effective
avenues currently available to unsuccessful refugee claimants seeking the right to remain in Canada.

refugee law are propounded. The paper explores this curious phenomenon whereby sanctuary providers replicate
the refugee determination process whose outcomes they
reject. Then, through a close analysis of the relevant provisions of Canadian state law, the paper argues that, although
sanctuary practices are frequently criticized on rule-of-law
grounds as involving illegal acts of civil disobedience, it is
not at all obvious that they should be considered as such. To
the contrary, while there may be some rule-of law-arguments
against Canadian sanctuary practices, it is also plausible to
understand these practices as a means through which faithbased communities prevent the state from violating both
Canadian and international refugee law.

Canadian Church Sanctuary Practices

The Lippert Study: Canadian Sanctuary Incidents
In Sanctuary, Sovereignty, and Sacrifice, Randy Lippert
offers a comprehensive study of Canadian sanctuary practices.8 Drawing on the work of Paul Weller, who studied sanctuary incidents in Britain,9 Lippert suggests that
sanctuary can involve either exposure or concealment
strategies. When sanctuary providers employ exposure
strategies they make sustained efforts to publicize the stories of those accorded sanctuary in the hopes that such publicity will make it politically difficult for state officials to
undertake deportation activities. In contrast, when sanctuary providers resort to concealment strategies they actively
hide those taking sanctuary so as to avoid their detection
by state officials and the deportation that might follow
from that detection.10 In his study of Canadian sanctuary
incidents, due in part to methodological considerations,
Lippert concentrates on the former. For the purposes of
his study, he defines sanctuary as “those incidents in which
migrants actually entered and remained in … [a church]
to avoid deportation and that entailed strategic efforts to
expose this fact to mass media, communities, and political
authorities.”11
Based on this definition, Lippert identifies thirty-six
sanctuary incidents in Canada during a twenty-year period beginning in 1983, when the first known instance of
Canadian church sanctuary occurred.12 These thirty-six
incidents concerned 261 migrants of twenty-eight different
nationalities.13 All but two incidents involved non-citizens
subject to deportation who had previously made unsuccessful refugee claims in Canada and who continued to allege
that they faced serious risks of persecution abroad.14
Perhaps the most striking of Lippert’s findings relates to
the outcomes of sanctuary incidents. In all thirty-six cases,
sanctuary successfully delayed deportation.15 Moreover,
during the twenty-year period of the study, the police and
immigration officials refrained from entering churches

Screening Procedures: Mimicking the Official Refugee
Determination System
One of the likely reasons sanctuary is so successful in
Canada is that churches carefully screen applicants to
ensure that only those who have strong cases for refugee
protection are accorded sanctuary.23 As a result, far more
migrants request sanctuary than are accorded it. Indeed,
United Church pastor Darryl Gray, whose congregation
offered sanctuary on two occasions, notes that he turns
away requests for sanctuary on a weekly basis, “because
they are often economic refugees who can’t prove they face
physical danger.” 24
To help congregations screen applicants for sanctuary, the
United Church has prepared a detailed pamphlet entitled
Sanctuary for Refugees?: A Guide for Congregations.25 This
30-page pamphlet, in addition to reproducing the text of the
refugee definition as established by the 1951 UN Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees,26 recommends steps that
can be taken to determine whether those requesting sanctuary meet the refugee definition. Included among those recommendations is the following:
A congregation … considering a request for sanctuary … must
learn as much as possible about that person to determine whether
or not this is a bona fide claim. Over two to three interviews … it
is essential to learn as much as possible about the person’s story. In
the interest of clarity, no reasonable question should be ignored or
considered impolite or irrelevant.
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Check the merits of the case with representatives of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Amnesty
International … Find out whether the country has a history of
gross and systemic human rights violations and tolerates the persecution of minority groups … Country Reports are also available
through regional Documentation Centres of the Immigration and
Refugee Board.27

until the appeal comes into force ‘refugee determinations’ will
continue to be made without the benefit of a sober second opinion
or an effective way to correct factual errors. This … has increased
the chances of bona fide refugees being deported.35

Similarly, according to a declaration by the Interfaith
Sanctuary Coalition:

What is interesting about these and other passages in the
guide is that they tell United Church congregations to carefully screen applicants for sanctuary using essentially the
same legal tests, the same means of evaluating testimony,
and even the same documentary evidence regarding country conditions that are employed in the official Canadian
refugee determination process. Moreover, the United
Church is not the only denomination to develop formal
screening practices that mimic the official refugee determination system in this manner. The Presbyterian Church,
for example, has issued guidelines that offer essentially the
same advice.28
Given the existence of such guidelines, it is likely that the
small number of migrants who successfully pass through
sanctuary screening procedures have highly persuasive
cases. It is therefore understandable that, in combination
with pressure brought to bear on political actors, sanctuary providers are frequently able to persuade immigration
officials to exercise their discretion to grant exceptions on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds to the regular rules regarding qualification for Canadian Permanent
Residence.29

Any system of adjudication is open to error. That is why virtually every decision-making process involving rights of any significance gives rise to a right of appeal. Since the abolition of capital
punishment in Canada, the decision to grant or refuse refugee
determination status is the only judicial decision in Canada which
can result in someone’s death.
Despite the extreme gravity of the refugee determination decision, there is no appeal on the merits available to refused refugee
claimants … The lack of appeal [is] … the most important flaw
in Canada’s refugee determination system, since its inception in
1989.36

In 2006, in response to these and similar critiques,37
Bloc Québécois MP Nicole Demers introduced a Private
Member’s Bill requiring the government to immediately
proclaim the coming into force of the legislative provisions
establishing the RAD.38 At the time of writing, the Bill had
passed the third reading in the House of Commons, and
appeared likely to be passed in the Senate. However, the Bill
was placed on hold by the decision of the Harper government to call an election in the fall of 2008. Nonetheless, it
is worth noting that in Parliamentary debates regarding the
RAD—including debates surrounding this Bill—the failure
to implement the RAD is frequently and explicitly linked
to the fact that unsuccessful refugee claimants who say that
mistakes were made in their initial refugee determination
resort to church sanctuary to avoid deportation.39 It thus
seems that sanctuary practices have been influential not just
in assisting individual migrants, but also in contributing to
the larger debates about Canadian refugee policy.

Policy Change and Sanctuary Incidents
In addition to the success of Canadian sanctuary incidents
at the level of individual cases, there is also some indication that sanctuary practices in Canada may be effective
at the level of policy change. According to Lippert’s study,
the frequency of Canadian sanctuary incidents is increasing. Indeed, 19 per cent of the sanctuary incidents Lippert
identified from 1983 through 2003 occurred in 2003.30 One
of the reasons for this increase is a frustration that sanctuary providers display towards a feature of Canada’s refugee determination system.31 Canada’s current immigration
legislation, passed in 2001, sets out a procedure through
which unsuccessful refugee claimants may have their
initial refugee determinations reviewed on their merits by
the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) of the Immigration
and Refugee Board.32 The Canadian government, however,
selectively implemented the provisions of the legislation,
bringing the provisions of the legislation into force33 except
those pertaining to the RAD.34 According to the United
Church’s pamphlet on sanctuary,

Recent Trends: Violations of Sanctuary
It must be acknowledged that two recent cases, at first glance,
appear to suggest that sanctuary may be less successful
today than it was during the period of Lippert’s study (i.e.
1983–2003).
The first incident occurred on March 5, 2004, when police
officers stormed the Saint-Pierre United Church in Quebec
City. The police officers were searching for Mohamed Cherfi,
an Algerian political activist who had made an unsuccessful
refugee claim and who was subject to a deportation order.40
To avoid his imminent deportation, Cherfi had publicly taken
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sanctuary in the church after convincing the church community that he faced a serious risk of persecution should he
be removed to Algeria. In the first known violation of sanctuary in Canada, Cherfi was arrested inside the church and
taken to a police station, where he was immediately transferred to the custody of Canadian Border Service Agency
(CBSA) officials. Several years prior, Cherfi had transited to
Canada via the United States. Thus, to effect his deportation,
CBSA officials drove him directly to the border, where he
was turned over to US immigration authorities.41
The second incident occurred on February 17, 2007, when
a police officer arrested Amir Kazemian inside an Anglican
church in Vancouver. Kazemian, also an unsuccessful refugee claimant subject to a deportation order, had been in
sanctuary in the church for almost three years. He alleged
that his refugee claim had been wrongly denied, noting that
his mother obtained refugee status in Canada (in a decision
made by a different refugee adjudicator) on the basis of identical factual allegations. Curiously, there is no indication that
the police set out to breach sanctuary in this case. In fact, it
was Kazemian who called the police to the church to investigate a complaint about a client of an online business he
ran from inside the church because the client had allegedly
engaged in threatening behaviour. When the police officer
arrived at the church and discovered the outstanding deportation order, however, she promptly arrested Kazemian. This
move surprised Kazemian’s supporters because other police
officers had interacted with him at the church on prior occasions without incident.42
While the Cherfi and Kazemian cases might appear to
suggest that sanctuary in Canada has become less successful
than it was in the 1980s and 1990s, on closer inspection such
a conclusion does not seem warranted. To appreciate why
this is the case, it is important to understand that neither
Cherfi nor Kazemian was ultimately returned to his country
of origin.
In Kazemian’s case, within two days of his arrest, which
garnered national media attention, the Department of
Citizenship and Immigration exercised its discretion to
grant his prior request for Canadian Permanent Residence
on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Immigration
officials, somewhat implausibly, claimed that the timing of
the decision was not related to his arrest.43
In Cherfi’s case, resolution was much longer in coming.
When Cherfi was forcibly removed from sanctuary and
deported to the United States he applied for US asylum
based on risks of persecution he claimed to face in Algeria.
US immigration officials initially denied his application.44
He then appealed this decision to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA). Fifteen months after he was first deported
from Canada to the United States, the BIA announced its

Number 1

decision: the initial decision was overturned and Cherfi was
granted refugee status in the United States.45 In other words,
the BIA confirmed the legal argument made by the church
that offered Cherfi sanctuary. That is to say, notwithstanding negative determinations within first instance refugee
adjudication forums in both Canada and the United States,
when given a meaningful opportunity to appeal these negative decisions, Cherfi was able to demonstrate that he did, in
fact, meet the refugee definition.

Legality and Canadian Sanctuary Incidents
Though the Cherfi and Kazemian cases—the only two known
instances where Canadian police have arrested migrants in
sanctuary—do not necessarily indicate that sanctuary has
become less successful in recent years, they do lead to the
main issue that I would like to address regarding Canadian
sanctuary practices, namely, that law plays a complex and
contested role in these practices.
Cherfi’s arrest and deportation generated significant
public debate about sanctuary.46 Judy Sgro, then Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration, further fanned the flames
of this controversy when, some months later, she called on
churches to cease providing sanctuary to unsuccessful refugee claimants.47 Sgro contended that sanctuary practices
should be stopped because they violate Canadian law. As
Sgro provocatively put it in the media, “Nobody is exempt
from the law, no matter where you are.” 48 Many Canadians,
as shown by letters to the editor,49 editorials,50 and calls to
national radio call-in shows,51 concurred with Sgro’s views.
Church groups, however, immediately responded to
Sgro’s comments by insisting that they would continue to
offer sanctuary.52 Moreover, many sanctuary supporters
contested Sgro’s simple characterization of sanctuary as
unlawful, suggesting that the matter was more complicated.
In particular, many noted that churches intervene only in
cases where the Canadian government is itself in danger of
breaching international law as a result of its failure to design
a refugee determination system with adequate procedural
safeguards to prevent refugees from being deported to face
persecution.53 As a spokesperson for the United Church of
Canada noted in the national media: “The only time a church
will ever put itself in the awkward place of offering sanctuary to someone who requests it is because we understand
that Canada … is not living up to its international obligations.” 54 Similarly, a press release prepared by an association
of congregations providing sanctuary notes:
“The real problem we want to address today is not sanctuary, but
the flawed refugee determination system that fails to protect some
refugees,” said Archbishop Andrew Hutchison … [c]iting the lack
of a merit-based appeal process in refugee determinations.55
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Other supporters of sanctuary, however, suggested that
it is precisely because of their distance from Canadian state
law that sanctuary practices are valuable and should be
maintained. For example, in an op-ed piece in the National
Post, Father Raymond de Souza wrote:

providers resort to this narrative when they claim that the
official refugee determination system produces results that
not only are unjust, but also violate higher legal principles.
Occasionally, the legal principles referred to are religious
in nature—i.e. God’s law, religious natural law, etc More
frequently, however, the claim is that deportation to face
human rights violations is a breach of international law. As a
result, where the official refugee determination system fails
to protect individuals who will be subject to human rights
violations on deportation, churches may legitimately take
measures to prevent deportation. In these circumstances, it
is the state authorities—not the churches—who are at risk of
violating the law.65
The third narrative involves individuals “(playing) with
the law.”66 In this narrative, the law is imagined as a set
of complex processes, each of which is fraught with error
and subject to significant delays. Individuals encounter
these processes and attempt to navigate them strategically.
In other words, law is experienced as a kind of high-stakes
game. According to Lippert, sanctuary providers demonstrate such an understanding of law when they assert that
sanctuary aims not to undermine existing legal processes,
but rather to delay deportation in order to provide migrants
with extra time during which legal processes can run their
course. The hope is that migrants will use this extra time to
obtain more favourable outcomes.67

The custom of sanctuary is a vestige of an era when the absolute power of the state needed trimming. Our legal system today
offers many protections and safeguards, but it is always good to be
reminded there are places where the state does not go and where it
does not assert its sovereignty.56

Or, as a caller to a national call-in radio show put it:
[Sanctuary] is the earliest form … [of] civil disobedience … of
communities, small groups religiously affiliated or otherwise …
resist[ing] top-down applications of power … When peaceful
people stand up and break the law … they almost always have very
good reasons for doing so. And so the state should … look at its
own processes to see what is causing this civil disobedience.57

Three Narratives about Law in Canadian Sanctuary
Practices
Given the existence of these controversies over the legality
of church sanctuary, it is not surprising that Randy Lippert,
in his systemic study of Canadian sanctuary practices,
concludes that law plays an important role for sanctuary
providers.58 To assess how Canadian sanctuary providers
understand the relation between sanctuary and law, Lippert
draws on the work of critical legal scholars Patricia Ewick
and Susan Silbey, who identify three distinct narratives
about how individuals interact with the law.59 Lippert then
examines how sanctuary providers draw on each of these
narratives.60
In the first narrative, individuals are imagined to be “up
against the law.” That is to say, they experience the law as an
oppressive force in their lives, a force that must be resisted
through avoidance strategies because it is too powerful to be
confronted directly.61 According to Lippert, sanctuary providers frequently deploy this narrative. More precisely, they
often present sanctuary as an extra-legal means through
which marginalized migrants may avoid coercive deportation that flows from what they consider to be arbitrary and
oppressive immigration laws. From this perspective, sanctuary is a form of civil disobedience to purportedly unjust
laws.62
In the second narrative, individuals are understood to
be “before the ‘higher’ law.”63 Here, “law” is not limited to
officially declared state legal norms. Instead, law is understood to be a majestic and rational force that “stands outside
and above social life.”64 According to Lippert, sanctuary

Sanctuary and Canadian State Law
While Lippert offers evidence to substantiate his claim that
sanctuary providers deploy each of these three narratives,68
his discussion of the role of law in sanctuary omits what
one would think to be a critical consideration: he does not
offer an extended analysis of the legality of sanctuary practices under state law. In fact, although he repeatedly asserts
that sanctuary is illegal,69 on only one occasion—in an
endnote—does he briefly articulate the basis of its illegality.
Here is that explanation in full:
Sanctuary is illegal under Canada’s Immigration Act and Criminal
Code because it involves aiding and abetting as well as conspiracy.
Since at least 1976, the Immigration Act has prohibited aiding and
abetting migrants subjected to deportation orders and has stipulated fines of up to CDN$5,000 and two years imprisonment.70

Now, to be fair, journalists,71 public officials,72 and even
sanctuary providers73 do frequently contend, often without
elaboration, that sanctuary practices violate Canadian state
law. Moreover, Lippert’s analysis of the role of law in sanctuary incidents aims primarily at understanding how sanctuary providers use and discuss law, rather than at inquiring
into the validity—from the perspective of state law—of such
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uses and discussions.74 As a result, his decision not to offer
an in-depth analysis of state law may be understandable. For
our purposes, however, closer attention to the relevant provisions of state law that purport to render sanctuary illegal
is warranted.

Number 1

international law, the latter (representing higher law) should
trump the former. That would be a scenario of conflict of law
between two distinct legal orders. Rather, the argument may
simply be that the removal order is invalid under domestic
law—possibly, but not necessarily, by virtue of the incorporation of international law into domestic law. This is not
a conflict of law scenario, but rather a straightforward question of legal validity from the perspective of a single (statebased) legal order.
Of course, while migrants in sanctuary may contend
that their removal orders are invalid due to breaches of
Canadian state law, and thus that they themselves are not
breaching Canadian state law by remaining in Canada, it is
unlikely that such arguments would be persuasive in court.
Indeed, those in sanctuary have usually already exhausted
all avenues for judicially reviewing their negative refugee
determinations as well as the subsequent immigration procedures culminating in their removal orders.86 Any available arguments regarding the legal invalidity of those procedures have, therefore, presumably already been rejected
by courts by the time migrants enter sanctuary.87
To say that courts are unlikely to accept arguments
regarding the invalidity of removal orders pertaining to
migrants in sanctuary, however, does not mean that such
arguments are unimportant to sanctuary practices. To the
contrary, it is precisely in order to ensure that migrants can
reasonably make such arguments that the church guidelines suggest that congregations provide sanctuary only
to migrants who demonstrate that they qualify for refugee protection under Canadian state law, notwithstanding contrary findings in the official refugee determination
system.88 In other words, one of the reasons congregations
resort to sophisticated screening mechanisms is to ensure
that sanctuary can be justified on the basis that the state has
misapplied and misinterpreted state law in particular cases.
Indeed, this helps to explain why sanctuary providers place
so much focus on systemic procedural flaws in the refugee
determination system, and, in particular, on the argument
that misinterpretations and misapplications of state law
in particular cases cannot currently be corrected because
of the lack of an effective appeal mechanism.89 What this
shows is that sanctuary is partly about individuals insisting
that state institutions, including courts, do not have the final
word on the interpretation of state law. Sanctuary practices
are, to put this point in slightly different terms, premised on
the notion that even the highest and most authoritative state
institutions can—and sometimes do—get the law wrong.
In my view, then, in the event that migrants in sanctuary
are charged with violating Canadian immigration law, and
in particular with remaining in Canada in contravention of
a removal order, courts are likely to dismiss arguments that

The Legality of Taking Sanctuary
There are two distinct questions to be asked regarding how
state law may render sanctuary practices unlawful. The first
relates to the lawfulness of taking sanctuary, and the second
relates to the lawfulness of providing sanctuary.
With respect to the first question, whether it is lawful for
migrants to take sanctuary, it must be recalled that migrants
only enter sanctuary when they are vulnerable to removal
from Canada.75 In principle, then, migrants in sanctuary will usually be in violation of an enforceable removal
order.76 Section 48(2) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act [IRPA] states that: “If a removal order is
enforceable, the foreign national against whom it was made
must leave Canada immediately.” 77 Moreover, the IRPA’s
general offences provisions (s.124), makes the violation of
s.48(2) an offence: “Every person commits an offence who
… contravenes a provision of this Act.” 78 The penalties for
this offence include a possible fine of $50,000 and a term of
imprisonment of up to two years.79
Of course, in order to commit an offence by remaining
in Canada in breach of a removal order, the removal order
in question must be legally valid. It is worth noting, however, that the validity of the removal order will frequently
be contested in sanctuary incidents. As we have seen, most
migrants in sanctuary are unsuccessful refugee claimants
who contend that an error was made in their initial refugee
determination. Indeed, the standard argument is not only
that there was an error committed during the initial refugee claim, but also that, due to systemic procedural flaws
in the refugee determination system—most notably the
lack of an appeal—the error cannot be corrected through
official channels.80 In such circumstances a removal order
might be invalid under state law for a variety of reasons,
including breaches of international law81 that has become
part of Canadian law,82 breaches of constitutional law,83
or breaches of administrative law norms of procedural
fairness.84
Lippert hints at such a possibility when he notes that
sanctuary providers adopting the “before the (higher) law”
narrative frequently make reference to international human
rights law.85 It is important to keep in mind, however, that
assertions about the invalidity of a removal order need not
take the form of a “higher” law argument. That is to say,
the contention is not necessarily that when a removal order
complies with state-based immigration law but breaches
48
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the underlying removal order is itself invalid under domestic law. However, arguments regarding the legal invalidity
of removal orders (as well as the legal invalidity of negative
refugee determinations that lead to removal orders) under
domestic state law remain central to Canadian sanctuary
practices.

Next, let us consider the immigration law provisions
on aiding and abetting. Based on documents provided in
response to an Access to Information Request, these provisions are at the heart of the legal theory according to which
government officials apparently feel that sanctuary violates
Canadian law. According to a document entitled “Avoiding
Deportation by Claiming Sanctuary,” prepared by the
Department of Citizenship and Immigration (CIC):

The Legality of Offering Sanctuary
With regard to the second question that must be posed when
assessing the legality of sanctuary—whether those who provide sanctuary violate Canadian state law—the matter is
even more complex.
There is one provision of Canadian immigration law 90
that is most frequently cited as purportedly rendering sanctuary unlawful, s.131 of the IRPA. This section reads, in
part:

It is an offence pursuant to IRPA to aid and abet a person to contravene the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. In practice
prosecution is discretionary and therefore churches which actively assist persons in evading removal have, to date not faced
charges.96

Similarly, a second document entitled “Sanctuary in
Churches,” also prepared by CIC, states: “Its [sic] is an
offence pursuant to IRPA … to aid and abet a person to contravene the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.” 97
In what sense, then, might providing sanctuary constitute aiding and abetting the offence of remaining in Canada
in violation of a removal order? Because no sanctuary providers in Canada have ever been charged under these provisions, there is no case law to assist us in interpreting the
provisions in this specific context. However, even setting
aside the arguments regarding the validity of the underlying removal orders in sanctuary cases, it is not obvious
that Canadian sanctuary providers in fact aid and abet the
commission of an offence.
In examining whether sanctuary providers engage in
aiding and abetting, the first step is to notice that while the
terms are often used in tandem, they do, in fact, represent
distinct offences. As Justice Cory put it in R. v. Greyeyes:

Every person who knowingly … aid or abets … a person to contravene section … 124, or who counsels a person to do so, commits an
offence and is liable to the same penalty as that person.91

As we have seen, migrants in sanctuary arguably commit
an offence under s.124 of the IRPA by remaining in Canada
in violation of a removal order.92 Thus, to the extent that
sanctuary providers (1) counsel, (2) aid, or (3) abet the commission of that offence, the IRPA renders sanctuary providers liable to the same punishment as the migrants themselves: up to two years in jail and a $50,000 fine.93
Let us deal with counselling first. The Supreme Court
has recently interpreted “counselling an offence” to mean
“deliberate encouragement or active inducement of the
commission of a[n] … offence.” 94 The Court has also noted
that the types of behaviour covered by counselling include:
advising, recommending, procuring, bringing about,
soliciting, asking repeatedly for, seeking, inviting, making
a request, petitioning, urging, instigating, or persuading.95
Now, it must be said that some sanctuary providers likely
do counsel particular individuals to enter sanctuary and
remain in Canada in violation of a removal order. Where
they do so, they may be guilty of counselling the commission of an offence. Where, however, migrants take the
initiative and decide to remain in Canada (whether in sanctuary or otherwise) in violation of a removal order without
being deliberately encouraged or actively induced to do so,
then sanctuary providers cannot be said to have counselled
the commission of an offence. In other words, providing
sanctuary does not necessarily entail counselling the commission of an offence. Rather, whether sanctuary providers engage in counselling the commission of an offence is a
contingent, factually dependent matter.

The terms “aiding” and “abetting” are often used together in the
context of determining whether persons are parties to an offence.
Although the meanings of these terms are similar, they are separate concepts … To aid … means to assist or help the actor … To
abet … includes encouraging, instigating, promoting or procuring the crime to be committed.98

Let us, therefore, consider “aiding” and “abetting” in turn.
With respect to “aiding,” it is important to recall the distinction between “concealment” and “exposure” strategies
in sanctuary practices.99 Where a church conceals a person
who is subject to a valid removal order so as to avoid detection by authorities, it seems clear that they are engaged in
the offence of “aiding.” However, where churches publicly
declare that they have provided sanctuary to a particular
migrant, adding that they will not take any steps to resist
official enforcement activities, then it is not clear how they
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prohibits not only “aiding”104 but also “harboring”105 aliens
not lawfully entitled to enter or remain in the country.
Indeed, in the 1980s several sanctuary providers were convicted of harbouring aliens unlawfully present in the US.106
Moreover, as in the US, harbouring is recognized as distinct
from “aiding” in Canadian law. For example, although the
Canadian Criminal Code contains general provisions on
“aiding,”107 it also explicitly criminalizes “harbouring”
those who commit specific crimes.108
There is, therefore, a distinction between “aiding” and
“harbouring” under Canadian law. Because Canadian law
does not explicitly prohibit harbouring migrants who are
unlawfully present in the country, in my view, merely providing shelter, food, and other services to such migrants
should not be considered “aiding” the commission of an
offence.
The second reason why “aiding” should not be interpreted to cover providing food, shelter, and other services to migrants subject to a removal order is that such an
interpretation would cast the net far too widely. Indeed,
this interpretation would criminalize the work of organizations that run shelters for women without legal immigration
status who are victims of domestic violence, legal clinics
that offer services to undocumented migrants, schools that
educate children who are not lawfully in the country, hospitals that provide emergency medical treatment to individuals without status, and even police services with “don’t ask,
don’t tell” policies regarding immigration status. By providing services to migrants unlawfully present in Canada,
such organizations arguably “aid” migrants to remain in
Canada unlawfully, and thus could, in principle, be covered
by the broadest possible reading of the “aiding” provisions.
However, if Parliament intended to criminalize all humanitarian assistance provided to migrants who are in the country unlawfully, surely they would have done so explicitly.109
Rather than adopting an overly broad understanding of
“aiding,” a more reasonable approach would be to restrict
“aiding” in this context to scenarios where the accused
materially assists migrants to avoid detection or otherwise
evade the enforcement of a valid removal order. In applying this restricted understanding of “aiding,” it is important to recall that when churches offering sanctuary engage
solely in exposure strategies, they, by definition, do not
assist migrants avoid detection. Moreover, while they may
increase the political cost of enforcing removal orders, they
often nonetheless assert in advance that they will not physically interfere with the enforcement of removal orders. In
my view, then, to the extent that sanctuary providers engage
solely in exposure strategies,110 they should not be understood to be “aiding” the commission of the offence com-

are “aiding” the migrant to commit the offence of remaining
in Canada in violation of a removal order. This is significant
because many churches take active steps not only to inform
state officials about their decision to accord sanctuary, but
also to indicate that they have no intention of interfering
with enforcement measures. The following comments by a
sanctuary provider are typical in this regard:
The decision was made right from the outset that this church
would never be locked so that the authorities could never say that
they were stopped from coming into the church. And we went on
public record … that the church was always open and we were not
going to stand in the way of the law.100

Other sanctuary providers echoed such an approach:
We called the immigration people and said, “If you want to come in
at any time, we will show you around …” If Immigration decided
that they wanted to come pick [the person in sanctuary] up, they
[can] just tell us. We’ll hold the door [open] … We aren’t going to
stand in the way of an actual apprehension, but we are also going
to grant her sanctuary.” 101

It is, moreover, important to note that, by virtue of
legislation repealing all recognition of sanctuary as a matter of state law in the seventeenth century,102 the fact that
migrants may be located inside churches in no way diminishes the legal authority of Canadian police or immigration
officials to enforce removal orders against them. If authorities choose not to enforce removal orders against migrants
they know to be taking sanctuary inside churches, that decision is purely political (i.e. the government wishes to avoid
the negative political reaction that media accounts of the use
of police force inside a church inevitably engenders). Merely
increasing the political cost of enforcing state law should not
be interpreted to constitute “aiding”; otherwise anyone who
seeks to bring public attention to unpopular enforcement
measures would be guilty of “aiding” the commission of an
offence.
It is worth noting one other sense in which sanctuary
providers might be said to commit the offence of “aiding,”
namely by sheltering, feeding, and providing other services to individuals in sanctuary. This reasoning would run
as follows: when people knowingly assist migrants subject
to removal orders by providing them with food, shelter, or
other services, they facilitate those migrants’ ongoing violations of the removal orders.
There are, however, two problems with such reasoning.
The first is that Canadian legislation does not explicitly prohibit “harbouring” individuals who are unlawfully present
in Canada.103 The equivalent US legislation, in contrast,
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mitted by migrants who remain in Canada in violation of a
valid removal order.
So much for “aiding,” but what about the third possible
grounds for the purported illegality of providing sanctuary, namely the immigration law provisions on “abetting”?
Abetting in Canadian law is similar to the criminal law provisions on counselling an offence, in that abetting involves
encouraging someone to commit an offence. As Justice Cory
noted in R. v. Greyeyes, the Criminal Code provides that

Moreover, as with a broad interpretation of “aiding,”
there is a serious danger in adopting an expansive reading
of “abetting” that would cover the kind of moral and political support that church communities offer migrants in
sanctuary. Merely offering moral and political support to
people who violate a valid law—rather than encouraging
them to break the law—should not constitute “abetting”
lest the net be too widely cast. In fact, an expansive interpretation of “abetting” would catch a significant number
of influential public officials and community leaders, who
regularly provide political assistance to migrants who are in
Canada in violation of removal orders. Indeed, several sitting members of Parliament have offered political support
to migrants in sanctuary, and would thus be vulnerable to
prosecution under an excessively expansive understanding
of “abetting.”113
In my view, the best interpretation of “abetting” in the
context of church sanctuary incidents is a restricted reading that would cover only circumstances where sanctuary
providers actively encourage migrants to remain in Canada
in violation of a valid removal order. Whether particular
sanctuary providers in fact do so is a factually contingent
matter; the mere accession to a request for sanctuary by a
migrant should not, on its own, be understood to constitute
“abetting.”

any person who abets any person in committing an offence is a
party to that offence. In order to secure a conviction, the Crown
must prove not only that the accused encouraged the principal
with his or her words or acts, but also that the accused intended
to do so.111

Similarly, in a frequently cited passage, the Alberta Supreme
Court explains that, to secure a conviction on the charge of
abetting, the accused
must intend that the words or acts will encourage the principal.
The criminal law is concerned with acts or words that are done or
uttered with the intent or for the purpose of counselling, encouraging, instigating or promoting the commission of the acts by the
principal actor. Accordingly before an accused person can be convicted the Crown must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, both the
words of encouragement and the intention of the appellant to so
encourage.112

The Final Word on Legality and Canadian Sanctuary
Practices
All of this is to say, then, that those asserting that Canadian
sanctuary practices are clearly illegal have not accorded
sufficient attention to the relevant provisions of state law.
A close assessment reveals that individuals taking sanctuary may appear to be in violation of a removal order, but
churches providing sanctuary take measures to ensure that
they can at least plausibly argue that these removal orders
are legally invalid under state law—even if the state refuses
to recognize this legal invalidity. Moreover, even if the
removal orders in question are legally valid, and it is thus
unlawful for individual migrants to remain in the country
by taking sanctuary, it is still not at all obvious that faithbased communities publicly providing sanctuary necessarily
violate state law.
In the end, while there is admittedly room for disagreement regarding the legality of Canadian sanctuary practices
under state law, what is certain is that such practices involve
a fascinating set of legal claims. In particular, sanctuary
practices raise competing jurisdictional claims between
multiple, partly overlapping, legal systems (i.e. domestic law,
international law, ecclesiastic law). They also involve differing interpretations about how those multiple legal systems
intersect, and what to do in the event of conflict—although

In other words, whether sanctuary providers engage in abetting rests on whether they encourage or instigate the commission of the principal offence (i.e. the migrant remaining
in Canada in violation of a valid removal order).
As with my discussion of the offence of counselling
above, whether sanctuary providers engage in abetting is
a factually contingent matter. Some sanctuary providers
likely do encourage migrants to remain in Canada in violation of a valid removal order. In other cases, however,
migrants requesting sanctuary fully intend to remain in
the country regardless of whether they succeed in obtaining
sanctuary. If they are unable to obtain sanctuary, they will
remain underground and try to avoid detection by immigration authorities. If, on the other hand, they succeed in
obtaining sanctuary they will publicly move into the church
and hope that the state chooses not to enforce the removal
order against them. In such circumstances, it is unclear in
what sense church communities that accede to requests for
sanctuary can be said to “encourage” the commission of the
principal offence of remaining in Canada in violation of a
removal order.
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I hasten to add that one should not be too quick to presume
that there are necessarily conflicts. Sanctuary practices also
raise questions about who has the final word on interpreting
norms within state-based legal systems, whether state institutions or those who are subject to them.
What I want to emphasize in all of this is that assessing the claims and questions raised by sanctuary practices
requires close attention not just to broad political arguments, not just, that is to say, to how sanctuary is discussed
and debated. Rather, close attention must also be paid to
the precise legal norms that inhere in the legal systems at
play in sanctuary incidents. Such close attention offers an
intriguing picture of legal systems not only conflicting, but
also interacting, and, at times, even mimicking one another
in order to publicly highlight the internal inconsistencies in
the opposing legal decision-making process.

Number 1

substantive complaints about the refugee determination
system. That is to say, sanctuary advocates suggest that, due
to systemic procedural flaws in the Canadian refugee determination system, including the lack of an effective appeal
mechanism to correct false negative determinations, some
who do in fact qualify for refugee protection under state
law are not recognized as such. Churches then suggest that
it is only because of these procedural flaws that they must
step in to prevent the unlawful deportation of such “genuine” refugees. In order to be in a position to plausibly make
such assertions, churches are placed in the curious position
of mimicking the decision-making processes mandated by
state law in order to determine whether those seeking sanctuary do, in principle, qualify for refugee protection.
The second sense in which sanctuary providers may claim
that they do not breach state law concedes that migrants in
sanctuary themselves violate immigration law. They may go
on to argue, however, that publicly providing sanctuary to
such individuals is not unlawful because, so long as sanctuary providers do not conceal migrants from authorities
and do not resist enforcement activities, they do not legally
interfere with the enforcement of state immigration law.
On this view, although the state may choose not to undertake deportation measures against individuals known to be
inside churches because it wishes to avoid the political consequences that such measures would bring, churches offering sanctuary do not impede these deportation measures in
a manner cognizable by state law. Of course, where sanctuary practices involve concealing migrants from detection by
immigration officials, such reasoning would not apply.
Taken together, the argument that Canadian government officials offered in response to the incident involving
Mohamed Cherfi (i.e. that churches should cease providing sanctuary because “no one is above the law”) is based
on an excessively narrow view of the legal claims involved.
To be sure, there are rule-of-law arguments in favour of the
notion that churches should not be allowed to exempt themselves from the application of Canadian immigration law.
Moreover, it must be acknowledged that some Canadian
sanctuary providers insist that sanctuary practices are
effective precisely because they involve a deliberate and
politically charged breach of purportedly unjust Canadian
laws (i.e. civil disobedience). However, there are also plausible rule-of-law arguments in favour of sanctuary practices.
Firstly, it is not clear that faith-based communities actually
breach state law when they provide sanctuary to those who
request it. Secondly, and in my view more importantly, sanctuary practices may actually uphold both Canadian and
international law by establishing a de facto appeal mechanism to catch errors in the procedurally flawed official refugee determination system, thereby preventing Canada from

Conclusion

Despite its formal abolishment as a matter of state law in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, church sanctuary
continues to be practiced in Canada to this day. These practices have been surprisingly effective, not just in terms of
preventing the de facto deportation of individual migrants
who allege a fear of persecution (and in securing legal immigration status for such individuals), but also in terms of placing significant pressure on government actors to introduce
policy changes that would bring the official refugee determination system into compliance with both domestic and
international law.
Law plays a complex and controversial role in contemporary Canadian sanctuary practices. While public debates
about the legitimacy of church sanctuary frequently turn on
the issue of whether sanctuary is a justifiable form of civil
disobedience to purportedly unjust laws, framing sanctuary
in such terms is problematic on several levels. In particular, many of those involved in church sanctuary practices
do not accept that these practices in fact violate state law,
and thus that they can accurately be characterized as civil
disobedience.
There are two distinct senses in which we can understand
these arguments. The first, which relates to whether the state
is acting lawfully in seeking to deport particular migrants,
is especially relevant when those seeking sanctuary claim
they face a risk of persecution abroad, notwithstanding
a contrary finding in the official refugee determination
system. Advocates of church sanctuary in such circumstances frequently suggest that deporting these individuals
is unlawful, and that when faith-based communities take
measures to prevent such unlawful deportations they are
actually enhancing respect for the rule of law. Interestingly,
these arguments usually involve procedural rather than
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unlawfully deporting refugees to countries where they face
persecution.
6.
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